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Abstract 
 
One of the key objectives of rail infrastructure charges has been stated as being to promote the efficient 
use of the infrastructure. Much effort has been put into the derivation of charging regimes by 
infrastructure managers and regulators throughout Europe, and a mix of differing regimes have been put 
in place. However, relatively little work has been undertaken to examine the impacts and incentivisation 
effects that these charging regimes produce. This paper gives consideration to relevant theory in this area, 
what one might expect - from first principles - and then reports on a number of interviews and case 
studies undertaken to explore these impacts and incentives. Finally, it discusses a number of 
methodological issues surrounding this area of research, and proposes further lines of enquiry that might 
reasonably be pursued. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Charging in the rail sector has, over recent years, made a number of moves towards 
greater efficiency and this has tended to lead to a greater degree of differentiation in the 
charges. A number of countries sought, as part of the reform of their national railway 
industries, to develop and implement systems of rail infrastructure charging that 
approximate to marginal cost pricing and, since adoption of Directive 2001/14 which 
requires rail infrastructure charges to be based on marginal cost, the majority of member 
states have now done the same. However, the ways in which Member States are basing 
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their systems on marginal cost principles differ from one country to the next and a 
diversity of approaches has developed. 
Previous research in this area has tended to focus on the design of infrastructure 
charging regimes which, in principle, promote efficient use of the infrastructure, 
efficient investment or which enable a particular degree of cost recovery. This has then 
led on to a substantial body of research into the measurement of costs, in particular of 
marginal cost (Wheat and Smith, 2008; Nash et al, 2008 etc)). 
There has been relatively little research in the area of how train operators react to the 
charges they face. There is, for example, no previous research to estimate infrastructure 
charge elasticities and no research into how train operators perceive and interpret 
different charging structures; i.e. whether they can interpret highly differentiated, 
complex regimes or whether there may be a necessity to keep things simple. A further 
apparent gap in the research on rail infrastructure charges relates to the issue of how 
operators pass on their costs to end-users – that is, passengers and freight forwarders - 
and how different infrastructure charging regimes impact on charges to end users. 
 There is, nevertheless, some evidence that train operator reactions to infrastructure 
charges are important. A key factor motivating the revisions to rail infrastructure 
charges in Britain in 2001 was the view that the initial system of infrastructure charges 
gave the wrong incentives to train operators and led to greater congestion on the 
network. User reactions were also a key factor in Germany, where the infrastructure 
charging system has undergone reforms largely motivated out of concerns about 
competitive incentives and user reactions amongst train operators. 
One can postulate that rail infrastructure charges might have two principal effects on 
train operators. Firstly, they might affect their behaviour, in terms of their use of the 
infrastructure and the way they operate their services. That is, a train operator’s decision 
as to whether to offer a rail service and how to offer that service – when, where and 
with what rolling stock, staffing levels etc – is likely to be affected by the charges that 
they will incur in doing so. If there is a differentiated charging system featuring 
relatively high infrastructure charges in peak times (as was proposed in Britain) or on 
highly utilized lines (as is the case in Germany and Austria), that may serve as a 
disincentive to an operator considering the introduction of a new or additional peak 
service. Correspondingly, relatively low charges at night, for example, or on less 
utilized lines are likely to serve as a stimulus to new or additional services. Secondly, 
rail infrastructure charges could be expected to affect the charges that train operators 
make to their customers, be they passengers or freight forwarders. In fact, there may be 
a feedback mechanism, whereby the charges that train operators are able to make to 
their customers has an impact on the rail infrastructure charges as well. For example, if 
a train operator is faced with a high infrastructure charge for operating a particular 
service but thinks that passengers place a high value on that service, they might decide 
to operate the service on the basis of being able to cover the cost of the infrastructure 
charges through charging high passenger fares. Indeed, the reason behind the high 
infrastructure charge for that service may actually be a factor of the value that train 
operators believe that their customers place on the relevant rail services. 
There are likely to be differences between reactions and impacts within the passenger 
as compared with the freight market. Freight is, in European rail systems, often a 
marginal activity, which is fitted around the passenger services. Freight may be more 
flexible, at least for some flows, in that the time windows it operates in are less 
constrained than for passengers. Furthermore, freight tends to be, and it would appear to 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 43 (2009): 83-112 
 85 
increasingly be, more international in its nature than passenger services. This then leads 
to the necessity for operators to interpret several, sometimes very different, systems of 
infrastructure charging as they pass through two or more countries. 
The diversity of infrastructure charging regimes that exist throughout Europe is, in 
one sense, a good opportunity to undertake comparative research in this area. That is, 
Europe provides a real world laboratory, in which the attributes and impacts of one 
system can be compared and analysed in relation to one or more others. However, it is 
not only infrastructure charging regimes that differ across different countries; 
differences in respect of subsidy to the industry, regulation of the industry, market entry 
and competition serve to cloud the issue somewhat. Hence, there is a rich set of 
situations to draw on for research purposes, but with this comes a set of varying 
contexts that need to be controlled for somehow. 
Our aim was to develop a better understanding of the ways, in principle and in 
actuality, in which users react to differentiated charges in the rail sector. At a relatively 
early stage in the work, it became clear that relatively little quantitative data would be 
available to us, and so our method naturally turned toward being based on a mix of 
reviews and case studies, drawn from those Member States that have been most active 
in the areas of rail charging. In this paper we begin by reviewing the few items of 
previous research on this topic, before then summarising the outcomes of a round of 
stakeholder interviews and the results of a set of four case studies. We then give 
consideration to methodological issues that might affect further research in this area, 
and close with our conclusions. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
There is relatively little literature relating to the impacts of charging in the rail sector 
in terms of rail infrastructure charges. We pick out here three notable studies relating, in 
one form or another, to rail infrastructure charges. 
Firstly, the Leeds Freight Transport (LEFT) model is used for multimodal freight 
demand modelling in the UK (Johnson, Whiteing and Fowkes, 2007). The model tests a 
range of individual policies for the UK. In order to form the ‘best case strategies’ for 
road and rail, the policies are bundled into two groups to form a Pro-rail strategy and a 
Pro-road strategy, which are tested against a Do-nothing strategy. The results are 
explained in terms of the impacts for 2016. 
The impacts of the policy of doubling rail track access charges (part of the pro-road 
strategy) for rail freight operators, on road and rail modes are illustrated in the table 
below. 
Table 1 shows that with the doubling of rail track access charges, rail tonnes fall by 
2.03% and even further by 4.71% in tonne kms in comparison to the Do-nothing 
scenario. The length of haul falls by 2.73% in comparison to the Do-nothing scenario. 
As expected, the impact on road is in the opposite direction with increases in tonnes and 
tonne-kms and the length of haul in comparison to the Do-minimum, but the increases 
are rather modest. Interestingly, introduction of marginal social cost pricing on roads, 
part of the pro-rail strategy, increases rail-tonne kms by 18% (reducing road by 11%). 
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Table 1: Impact of Doubling Rail Track Access Charges by Mode for 2016. 
Mode   
Tonnes (millions) 
Change from do nothing (%) 
196.9 
-2.03 
Tonne kms (billions) 
Change from do nothing (%) 
28 
-4.71 Rail 
Length of Haul 
Change from do nothing (%) 
141.9 
-2.73 
Tonnes (millions) 
Change from do nothing (%) 
1935.2 
0.14 
Tonne kms (billions) 
Change from do nothing (%) 
170.3 
0.7 Road 
Length of Haul 
Change from do nothing (%) 
87.8 
0.56 
Tonnes (millions) 
Change from do nothing (%) 
2132.1 
-0.07 
Tonne kms (billions) 
Change from do nothing (%) 
198.3 
-0.1 Total 
Length of Haul 
Change from do nothing (%) 
92.8 
-0.03 
Source: adapted from Johnson, Whiteing and Fowkes, 2007. 
 
It must be noted that several other multimodal models do exist for testing transport 
policies and scenarios, such as the MODEV model in France. But these models usually 
do not include a specific representation of infrastructure charges. The impact of 
infrastructure charges can be taken into account only indirectly, generally through the 
impact it is supposed to have on final rail prices. 
Secondly, Preston, Holvad and Raje (2002) contrast infrastructure costs and charges 
in Britain and Sweden during the late 1990s. Although rail infrastructure costs appear 
similar on a track km basis in both countries, they highlight that British charges per 
train km were almost eight times those of Sweden. Table 2 shows the similarities in cost 
figures (particularly in terms of cost per track mile) and Table 3 shows the differences 
in infrastructure charge values. The basis of the charging regimes in Britain and Sweden 
are different. With charges in Britain being set on the basis of full cost recovery and 
charges in Sweden being based on short-run marginal cost. 
Table 2: Comparison of Railtrack and Banverket’s Infrastructure Wear and Tear Costs – 1998. 
 
Infrastructure 
Wear and Tear 
Cost 
£m 
Cost per 
Route Mile 
(£) 
Cost per 
Track Mile 
(£) 
Cost per 
Train Mile 
(£) 
Cost per 
Traffic Unit 
(£) 
Railtrack 2290 217000 108000 7.95 0.051 
Banverket 874 129000 113000 6.71 0.033 
Source: Preston, Holvad and Raje, 2002. 
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Table 3: Swedish and British Rail Infrastructure Charges Compared (1999/2000 prices £ per train km). 
1990 0.882 1994/5 6.032 Sweden 
2000 0.646 
Great Britain 
1999/2000 5.039 
Sources: Nash, 1997, Prognos, A.G., 2000. 
Assumes increases in RPI 1990/91 to 1999/2000 are 27.8% (http://www.netaccountants.com/rpi.html). 
Assumes that €1=£0.646 Oct 1999 (http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/mb199912en.pdf). 
 
Preston et al (2002) noted that on track competition in the passenger rail market is 
currently limited, but postulated that were such competition to be permitted on a wider 
scale, the extent would be influenced by the level of track access charges. To explore 
this, they used a simulation model - PRAISE - to assess the impact of on-track 
competition in both Britain and Sweden. 
They found that, for a main line intercity route in Britain, competition would be 
largely of a cream skimming nature, with the new entrant concentrating its services 
during the peak periods of the day. Evaluation of this competition found that, although 
it was profitable for the new entrant, it would not improve welfare overall. Furthermore, 
head on and fares competition did not appear to be profitable where infrastructure 
charges are based on full cost recovery, with the possible exceptions of some route and 
product competition. By contrast, for Route S1 in Sweden, it was found that on-track 
competition would lead to large service increases and significant fare reductions, and 
that this would represent a welfare improvement on the current situation; however, it 
would force a parallel route, currently commercial, into requiring subsidy. They went on 
to observe that, in Sweden, a greater proportion of the passenger rail network can be 
operated commercially because infrastructure charges are much lower than in Great 
Britain. Hence, there is greater scope for commercial on-track competition in Sweden 
than in Britain. 
Table 4: Estimated Impact of an Increase in Track Access Charges on Rail Freight Traffic  
(tonnage in 2014). 
Impact of a track access charge 
increase (%) 
Commodity Growth by 2014 
(%) 
+20% +50% 
Maritime Containers 50 -6.4 -15.2 
ESI coal -9 -0.4 -1.1 
Other coal 0 -0.7 -1.6 
Metals 12 -1.9 -6.3 
Iron Ore -5 0 0 
Construction 46 -10.5 -17.7 
Automotive 100 -3.2 -8.5 
Petroleum and chemicals 4 -1.8 -5.9 
Waste 15 -0.1 -0.2 
Domestic intermodal 215 -5.4 -13.5 
Spent nuclear fuel 0 0 0 
Mail/premium logistics n/a -2.3 -5.8 
Channel Tunnel 261 -2.1 -5 
Total 20 -3.9 -7.9 
Source: ORR 2006, page 6 (i.e. table above) 
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Finally, the British Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) commissioned MDS Transmodal 
to assess the impact of an increase in track access charges on freight traffic (ORR, 
2006). This work formed part of their work to review British charges, and was designed 
to investigate the impacts of including a mark-up on infrastructure charges for freight so 
as to recover the costs of freight-only lines. MDS used the GB Freight model along with 
models for intermodal and coal traffic, and their results are summarised in Table 4. 
 
 
3. Stakeholder Interviews 
 
A next step in our methodology involved a round of 25 interviews with industry 
stakeholders, undertaken in early 2007. Rail infrastructure managers, regulators and 
train operators (both passenger and freight) from six countries – Austria, Britain, 
France, Germany, Italy and Sweden – were interviewed using a common semi-
structured interview framework. Full details of the interviews are reported in Matthews 
et al (2007); here we provide a summary of the key findings to emerge. 
One early finding was that, whilst infrastructure charges are a potential influence on 
train operator behaviour, other cost elements for train operators (staffing costs, train 
operating costs etc) and demand elements (demand reactivity to price levels, to quality 
of service, willingness to pay, etc) would also be expected to be important influences on 
the market. Furthermore, the rail market is also likely to be affected by a host of 
contextual factors, including the competitive and regulatory framework (monopoly or 
oligopoly, type of regulation) and levels of car ownership and economic growth. 
Secondly, whilst we were able to gather information about infrastructure charge 
categories and levels for the selected case study countries, we very often encountered a 
lack of even the basic information about precise infrastructure charge quantities (i.e. 
train-paths, or train-km) bought for each category. Many of the other elements are 
viewed by train operators as being commercially sensitive; even the price levels are 
often not precisely observable, due to yield management techniques introduced in 
preparation for competition in the rail market. 
Hence, it was concluded that a systematic analysis of the impact of infrastructure 
charge differentiation seems an extremely difficult prospect at this point. Disentangling 
the impact of charges from the impacts of all of the other significant influences on the 
rail market, amidst a diversity of charging regimes and contexts, with a limited supply 
of detailed data, would appear to be highly problematic. 
The rail market is comprised of many different sub-markets, and there are potentially 
different scales of impacts in different sub-markets. In actuality, it appears to be the case 
that, in many situations, operators have relatively limited scope to adapt their supply 
policy and their tariffs in response to infrastructure charges. For instance, where 
services are franchised, e.g. as is the case with regional passenger services in Germany 
or France, and with nearly all passenger services in Britain, services are quite closely 
defined by the terms of those franchises. Hence, there is limited scope for operator 
response to infrastructure charges during the life of the franchise. However, charges 
may serve to influence the terms of franchises, either through franchising authorities 
examining the implications of the charges for the services they wish to specify or 
through the terms of the franchise bids submitted by competing operators. This 
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mechanism for response, being contained within the planning process, is very difficult 
indeed to tap into. 
In some situations, there may be no reaction at all on the part of train operators, due to 
mechanisms of compensation being in place. For instance, again where services are 
franchised it is common (and reasonable) for the terms of that franchise to require 
operators to be compensated by the franchising authority for any changes in 
infrastructure charges during the course of the franchise. Again, it may be possible to 
tap into the impacts as they relate to the franchising authority, but this would again be 
expected to be problematic. 
Nevertheless, whilst reactions may be difficult to analyse and, in certain situations, 
relatively limited in scale, our interviews did uncover which sorts of parameters have 
been affected. Main reactions observed were in relation to: 
 
- Design and choice of rolling stock; 
- Suppression of unnecessary path reservations when reservation charges were 
introduced in France. 
 
There was some interesting discussion of the share of train operating costs comprised 
of infrastructure charge-payments, and we have come to the view that the scale and 
form of reaction to infrastructure charges is likely to depend crucially on these cost 
shares. The cost shares for the use of infrastructure vary markedly across the 
interviewees in different countries. In general, the share of infrastructure charge costs as 
a proportion of train operating costs was reported to range between 10% and 30%. 
However, in Sweden the cost share was estimated at approximately 5%, whilst in 
Germany some operators estimated it to be as high as 60%. 
Almost all participants indicated elasticities greater than one. There are reasons to 
doubt whether elasticity in all cases is greater than one, since the interviewed persons 
represent at the same time the interests of their industry, and therefore it is natural that 
interviewed persons in such cases tend to exaggerate. 
Interestingly, on a number of occasions, operators reported that current degrees of 
differentiation were actually insufficient to elicit a reaction. For example, participants in 
Austria and Germany expressed the view that charge differentiation for highly utilized 
lines seems, due to the higher operating costs of the lower charged tracks, to miss its 
goals. Apparently there would be more recognizable effects if there was a higher degree 
of differentiation. Furthermore, many operators reported that they would be ready to 
accept higher charges in exchange for better quality of service. 
In all of our sets of interviews, freight operators indicated a greater degree of 
sensitivity to infrastructure charges than did passenger operators. In general rail freight 
tends to be privately operated, is confronted with severe competition from the road, has 
experienced more open access competition and receives less government financial 
support, than do passenger services, and together these factors may explain this apparent 
greater degree of sensitivity. In Britain, for example, there has been significant growth 
in the rail freight market since infrastructure charges for freight operators were revised – 
incorporating a marked reduction in their level – in 2001. The extent to which this 
growth is as a result of this revision is, however, not clear as other changes in the 
market have occurred simultaneously; nevertheless, it potentially offers an interesting 
line of further enquiry. 
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An initial hypothesis was that one of the impacts of differentiated infrastructure 
charges would be on prices charged to end-users – passengers and freight forwarders. In 
some cases, e.g. where services are franchised and infrastructure charges change during 
the course of the franchise, it seems clear that any such impact on prices to end-users is 
minimal or non-existent. Beyond this, it would seem that there would be some impact, 
but that this impact would be heavily influenced by the degree of external competition – 
be that from other rail operators or from other transport modes - in the end-user market. 
In general, the greater the degree of external competition the smaller the likely impact 
of infrastructure charges on prices to end-users. Indeed, the level of external 
competition often appears to be more important in determining end-user prices than 
infrastructure charges. 
Finally, it became clear that the data situation with respect to user reactions to 
differentiation of track access charges in rail is very problematic. Certainly, the charges 
themselves are public (although in freight some are the subject of private contracts) but 
the necessary data to analyse the reactions of the train operators with respect to output 
quantity (e.g. train kilometres), prices, costs and adjustment of production processes 
(choice of path or of type of rolling stock etc.) are extremely unsatisfactory or none 
existent. 
 
 
4. Case studies 
 
Having found that freight operators indicated a greater degree of sensitivity to 
infrastructure charges than did passenger operators, we concentrated much of our 
subsequent attention on the freight market. As referred to above, rail freight tends to be 
privately operated, is confronted with severe competition from the road, has 
experienced more open access competition and receives less government financial 
support, than do passenger services, and together these factors may explain this apparent 
greater degree of sensitivity. 
We undertook four case studies focused on rail freight. Three case studies analysed 
changes in the rail freight market in order to make informed observations regarding 
potential linkages between changes in the infrastructure charging regimes and changes 
in rail freight traffic; one focused on Britain, one on France and the third on Eurotunnel. 
The fourth case study undertook aggregate modelling, applying the LEFT model to the 
British rail freight market, to test a number of charging scenarios for their impacts. 
Additional case studies, focused on passenger services, were also undertaken, details of 
which are reported in Matthews et al (2008). 
 
4.1. Observations of Reactions in the British Freight Market 
 
Up to the point of British rail privatisation which commenced in 1993, the demand for 
rail freight had been on a 40-year downward trend. However, having reached a low-
point in 1995, demand has grown over the subsequent 10 years for which we have data. 
There has been an increase in rail freight over the last ten years from 15 billion tkm 
moved in 1996 to 22 billion tkm in 2006. In terms of the total growth in freight across 
all four modes illustrated, there has been an increase of 189% from 1953 to 2005. 
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Privatisation established a series of privately-owned open access rail freight operators, 
required to pay Track Access Charges to the infrastructure manager for the use of the 
network. During this period there have been 2 sets of infrastructure charges in place for 
freight operators. The first framework of charges for freight train operators was put in 
place in 1995. This framework remained in place until 2001, when the first Periodic 
Review of Track Access Charges recommended substantial changes be made.  
The first charging framework, introduced in 1995, was a negotiated two-part tariff, 
based on the value to each user of using the infrastructure, subject to the constraints of 
covering avoidable costs and avoiding discrimination between operators competing in 
the same sector. A charge ‘floor’ and a charge ‘ceiling’ were established. The floor was 
based on the avoidable costs, whilst the ceiling was based on standalone costs, I.E. 
those costs that ‘… would be incurred by a notionally efficient competitor providing a 
dedicated network for the service(s) in question.’ (ORR, 1997, cited in Stitle, 2004). In 
fact, the two-part tariff comprised a large fixed component and a relatively small 
variable component. The average track access charge under that framework payable by 
freight operators was estimated as being approximately £6.23 per thousand gross tonne 
miles (kgtm), whilst Railtrack's freight-specific costs were of £5.53 (CFIT, 2001). 
 
 
Figure 1: Domestic Freight Transport Moved (Billion Tkm) by Mode 1953-2005. 
Source: Transport Statistics Great Britain 2007. 
 
By 2001, gross tonne mileage had increased by more than 35% and additional growth 
was anticipated. Indeed, the government had set out an ambitious strategy for increasing 
demand for rail freight, with a target of achieving 80% growth over the period 1998/99-
2010 and, with this in mind, a number of new operators were considering entering the 
market. Concurrently, rail freight was thought to be facing increased competitive 
pressures from road and other modes. For example, decisions to allow the operation of 
44 tonne lorries and to stabilise vehicle/fuel duty were considered to be giving road 
haulage a significant competitive advantage. Furthermore, the periodic review of access 
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charges for franchised passenger train services had the effect of changing the balance of 
incentives between rail passenger and freight services on the network. 
These changes in rail freight market conditions led the Regulator to conclude that it 
was appropriate to undertake a review of the freight charges. Crucially, a better 
understanding of cost causation had developed, meaning that there was a stronger body 
of evidence on which to base a new set of charges. 
Prior to the outcome of the Periodic Review of Track Access Charges in 2001, an 
independent government advisory body, the Commission for Integrated Transport 
(CFIT) established a Rail Freight Working Group to consider track access charges. 
CFIT believed that rail infrastructure charges for freight services were “a significant 
factor for the further expansion of the domestic freight market”. In particular, their view 
was that the high costs of track access were serving to hold back rail freight operators 
from diversifying into non-bulk traffic. They commissioned research to analyse how rail 
freight operators could set about achieving the Government’s target of growing the rail 
freight market by 80% by 2010, with particular attention given to the influence of the 
amount paid for track access. 
This work identified infrastructure charges as one of seven key issues associated with 
growing the rail freight market and estimated the level of track access charges which 
would need to apply, under various scenarios, to deliver the Government's 80% growth 
target. Under a central scenario, which assumed relatively small improvements in rail 
service efficiency, and continued decline in road haulage journey times (and efficiency), 
they estimated that an average track access charge of £3.50 per kgtm would deliver 
approximately 80% growth by 2010. This implied almost a halving of the then average 
track access charge. Under a "worst case" scenario, assuming no improvement in rail 
service efficiency or journey times over road haulage, they estimated that an average 
track access charge of £1.50 per kgtm would be required to deliver the same volume of 
growth by 2010. 
The outcome of the 2001 Periodic Review represented a fundamental shift away from 
a negotiation-based approach to a published set of charges, the stated aim of which was 
to reflect the variable costs to the infrastructure manager of freight operations. The 
intention was that this would reduce transaction costs, improve operators’ ability to plan 
their businesses and create a more level playing field for new and potential freight 
operators. 
A fundamental change involved the Regulator no longer requiring that freight 
operators be expected to pay either fixed freight costs or the infrastructure manager’s 
costs which are common between freight and passenger operations for use of the 
existing network. The charges comprised three components: 
 
- Usage charges – designed to reflect infrastructure wear and tear costs directly 
attributable to particular services; 
- Traction electricity charges – designed to relate directly to the amount of 
electricity consumed by any particular vehicle; and  
- Capacity charges – designed to broadly reflect the congestion costs associated 
with increases in capacity utilization. 
 
The effect of these changes was that, on average, the charges that freight operators 
paid to the infrastructure manager were halved. The resulting shortfall in revenue to the 
infrastructure manager from freight operations, which was estimated as being £500 
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million over a 5 year period, was to be funded by the government (via the Strategic Rail 
Authority). In addition, performance regime arrangements were put in place to provide 
both freight operators and the infrastructure manager with an incentive to reduce the 
delay which they impose on users of the network. 
Interestingly, the outcome of the Periodic Review was very close to the charges 
associated with the ‘central scenario’ examined in the work for CFIT. It is, therefore, 
revealing to examine the growth in the demand for rail freight and how that compares 
with that projected in the CFIT work. 
The trends in commodities moved by rail over 1998-99 to 2006-07 are illustrated in 
Table 5. It shows that, across all commodities, there has been a growth of 28%. Within 
this, it is notable that coal traffic has almost doubled and construction traffic has 
increased by a significant 29%. 
Table 5: National Railways Freight - Freight Moved by Commodity 1998-99 to 2006-07 (Billion Tonne-
Kilometres). 
 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 
Coal 4.5 4.8 4.8 6.2 5.7 5.8 6.7 8.3 8.8 
Metals 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.4 2.7 2.4 2.6 2.2 2.1 
Construction 2.1 2.0 2.4 2.8 2.5 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.7 
Oil and petroleum 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.5 
Other traffic 7.1 7.6 7.4 6.7 6.6 6.8 7.0 7.1 7.0 
All traffic 17.3 18.2 18.1 19.4 18.5 18.9 20.4 21.7 22.1 
Source: Transport Statistics Great Britain 2007. 
 
Table 6 illustrates the trends in rail freight lifted for coal, other traffic excluding coal, 
and of all traffic over the period 1998-99 to 2006-07. It shows a decline over the first 
part of the period, followed by an increase, resulting in an overall growth over the 
period of 6%. Linking this to the numbers presented in Table 5, this indicates that rail 
freight growth has been associated more with an increase in the distance freight is 
moved than the actual quantity of freight being moved. In terms of coal, despite the 
increase in tkm in 1998-99 to 2000-01, there has been a decline in tonnes lifted. Despite 
the 29% increase in coal tkm in 2001-02, tonnes lifted only rose by 12% in that same 
year. In the years that followed, changes in coal tkm were also characterised with 
changes in tonnes lifted in the same direction. However as coal tkm rose from 8.3 to 8.8 
billion from 2005-06 to 2006-07, tonnes lifted decreased slightly from 48.9 to 48.8 
million over that same period. In terms of all rail freight traffic lifted over the last 
decade, the lowest point was in 2002-03 where only 87 million tonnes were lifted. 
Table 6: National Railways Freight - Freight Lifted by Commodity 1998-99 to 2006-07 (Million Tonnes). 
 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 
Coal 45.3 35.9 35.3 39.5 34.0 35.2 44.0 48.9 48.8 
Other traffic 56.8 60.6 60.3 54.5 53.0 53.7 57.1 58.7 59.6 
All traffic 102.1 96.5 95.6 93.9 87.0 88.9 101.1 107.6 108.4 
Source: Transport Statistics Great Britain 2007 
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Thus, whilst charges were essentially halved in 2001, growth in rail freight demand is 
not proceeding in line with the 80% government target (as the CFIT projections 
estimated that it would). Having grown by an impressive 4.8 billion tonne-kilometres 
between 1998-99 and 2006-07, it would have to grow by a further 9 billion tonne-
kilometres over the next 3 years in order to achieve this target. This then begs the 
question of how the assumptions of the CFIT ‘Central scenario’ compare with what has 
actually occurred since 2001. Certainly a number of unforeseen events have taken place 
over the period, including the closure of a major steel works (reducing demand for both 
coal and steel traffic), the switching of postal services from rail to road and the essential 
break down of the Strategic Rail Authority’s freight strategy. However, it is tempting to 
conclude that perhaps the CFIT work over-stated the importance of the role of 
infrastructure charges in stimulating rail freight demand. 
Nevertheless, there has been considerable growth in rail freight over recent years and 
infrastructure charges are likely to be partly responsible for this. Indeed, commentators 
have tended to site six factors as explaining the growth since 1995, as follows: 
 
- Increased road congestion; 
- Increased costs for road freight arising out of the fuel duty escalator and, more 
recently, the Working Time directive; 
- An increase in coal imports; 
- Improved quality of service for rail freight; 
- Investment in rail freight facilities; 
- Infrastructure charge changes. 
 
In terms of the types of commodities transported, there has been strong growth in 
some sectors. This has been most notable in relation to coal, which rail is inherently 
better-suited to carrying. The movement of coal and coke currently dominates rail 
freight, and 87% of coal and coke were carried by rail in 2006 (MDS GB Freight report 
2006). However, it is thought that, for coal, transport accounts for only approximately 
5% of the price of delivered coal, so the market is thought to be relatively insensitive to 
changes in the costs of transport. Hence, the actual growth in coal tonnes lifted was 
probably not related to the regime of infrastructure charges, but more concerned with 
changes in the detail of the power-generation market. The charge reductions may have 
enabled length of haul for coal and other traffic to increase at relatively little expense. 
Length of haul for coal traffic, for example, increased by 15% between 2001-02 and 
2006-07. However, on inspection, this seems to simply be the continuation of a trend 
that commenced prior to 2001. The average length of haul was 120kms in 1980 and had 
risen to 206kms by 2004 (MDS GB Freight report 2006). 
There has also been quite strong growth in construction traffic. In contrast to coal, the 
construction market is thought to be very price sensitive, with transport accounting for 
as much as 50% of the price of delivered materials. Hence, it is likely that charge 
reductions would stimulate growth in construction traffic. However, construction traffic 
since 2001 has fallen, then risen and, most recently, fallen again to a point slightly 
lower than that in 2001. It must be concluded that if charges are having an impact on 
this market, some other factor is clearly having an offsetting impact. 
Rail freight growth actually started in 1995, and we do not observe a major change in 
the trend around the time of the reductions in infrastructure charges introduced in 2001. 
Prior to 2001, the structure of charges was such that there was a large fixed charge 
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which, once paid, provided an incentive to operate as much as possible. Post 2001 the 
structure no longer provided this incentive but it did allow for increased 
competitiveness, but the level was such that it enabled the rail freight market to remain 
buoyant. It is thought that, initially, charge-reductions were only passed on to clients in 
a limited way – so part of the reduction was enjoyed by the operators as windfall gains. 
Then, once contracts with clients were renegotiated, the reduction in charges were past 
on as reductions in charges to clients. Furthermore, differentiation by vehicle-type is 
thought to have focused the industry on track-friendly bogies. 
As the rail freight industry has become more competitive and cost-conscious, it is 
rational that operators will pay more attention to what they are being charged for access 
to the infrastructure. It is suggested that this will have alerted operators to possible 
arguments for reduction of charges. Such arguments may have an effect on the overall 
charge level, as the rail freight industry has a strong incentive to make robust 
representations to the charge-setting authorities. They might also relate to incentives for 
operators to reduce impact of rail freight on the network, e.g. by operating less-
damaging rolling stock, by requiring fewer slots to operate a particular service etc. 
 
4.2. Observations of Reactions in the French Freight Market 
 
Infrastructure charges in France were first implemented in 1997, at which time the 
French infrastructure manager, Réseau Ferré de France (RFF), had just been set up. The 
network was divided into track categories and the charging components were 
established as follows: 
 
- DA - a fixed access right;  
- DR - a path reservation fee;  
- DC - a charge for train circulation; and  
- Additional charges, such as for the use of electrical supply equipment and access 
to marshalling yards. 
 
RFF was not then able to make a precise bill to SNCF, the only rail operator on the 
French network up to 2005, so the charging regime comprised a global package based 
on traffic, up to 2002. Hence, no freight or passenger trains had any marginal 
infrastructure charge to pay until 2002. Therefore, whereas the evolution of the total 
charges paid may be observed from 1997, the evolutions of unit price levels have to be 
made on the basis of 2002 or later years. 
There have been several changes to charging structure and levels over the period. The 
level of charges was increased extensively in 1999, but this increase was chiefly focused 
on passenger traffic, with only a 2% increase in freight charges. Freight traffic 
decreased slightly (-1%) in 1999, then increased by 6% in 2000 before decreasing again 
in 2001 by some 9%. 
From 2002 on, the structure of charges is stable and gives marginal charge levels' 
signals to the operator(s). Yearly arrêtés from the Ministry of Transport set the charging 
regime for one year and, generally, charge levels are known at least one year in 
advance. Given this level of pre-announcement, we assume that demand can adapt more 
or less to these evolutions with no important delay, allowing us to compare directly 
yearly traffic and tariffs. Additional charges such as those applying for the use of 
marshalling yards are not covered by these arrêtés. 
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The arrêté setting the 2002 charging regime defined the track categories, as set out in 
Table 7. 
Table 7: RFF Track Categories. 
Track category Subclasses Length Designation 
High level of traffic 287 km A Urban and 
suburban lines Medium level of traffic 985 km B 
High level of traffic C 
High level of traffic and max. speed 220 
km/h 
7,209 km C* 
Medium level of traffic D 
Main interurban 
lines 
Medium level of traffic and max. speed 220 
km/h 
5,840 km D* 
Other lines  12,738 km E 
High level of traffic 718 km N1 
Medium level of traffic N2 
Mediterranean HSL, medium level of traffic 457 km N2* 
Low level of traffic N3 
Mediterranean HSL, low level of traffic 321 km N3* 
High-speed lines 
East-European line 300 N4 
Note: the length per track category actually changes slightly from year to year. 
 
Key aspects of the charging regime introduced in 2002 are as follows: 
- DA is zero for D and E track categories. It is 365.88 €/path-km used per month for 
A & B, and 3.05 € for C track category. 
- DR is composed of a reservation fee (DRS) and a 0.6 coefficient (coefficient K) 
for freight trains (this means that freight trains get a 40% rebate on path 
reservation fee in return for lower quality paths – quality of passenger trains being 
consistently favoured). The levels of this charging component are set out in 
Table 8. 
Table 8: DRS Tariffs for Conventional Track Categories in 2002 (€/Path-Km). 
 A B C D & E 
Off-peak hours 1.52 0.61 0 0 
Normal hours 4.88 1.22 0.8 0 
Peak hours 14.3 2.44 0.8 0 
 
DC is set lower for freight trains than for passenger trains (0.23 €/train-km vs. 0.79), 
whilst a fee for power transport (RCTE) is created. Like the use of electrical supply 
equipment (RCE) and the use of marshalling yards, etc., it is an optional service. Rail 
freight traffic remained stable. 
In 2003 DA was increased slightly for track categories A and B, but a coefficient M 
was created for differentiating this access fee, for A, B and N track categories, varying 
with the number of reserved paths and the duration of the agreement for those paths, as 
set out in Table 9. Total DA paid decreased (86 M euros i.e. 4.7% of total charges vs. 95 
M euros and 5.2% in 2002). 
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Table 9: M Coefficient for Access Fee DA. 
Coefficient M Number of booked paths in A, B, N 
Per category 1-10 11-100 101-1000 >1000 
Purchase agreement < 5 years 0.03 0.225 1.5 1.5 
Purchase agreement > 5 years 0.02 0.15 1 1 
 
Furthermore, coefficient K was divided into 2 categories: K=1 for train paths > 300 
km with an average speed > 70 km/h (meaning no rebate for these “rapid” trains, that 
correspond roughly to “high value” freight such as containerised traffic), and K=0.6 for 
all other freight trains. In addition, all DRS and DC tariffs increase by 2 %. 
Freight traffic decreased by 6.4%, but it is understood that this was mainly due to a 
long strike during the spring. SNCF freight branch’s losses reached 450 M€. A 3-year 
restructuring plan, the Plan Fret 2006, is implemented. It aims at focussing on heavy-
haul, profitable services, and defines a new strategy based on customer approach and a 
better quality of service. SNCF forecast that they would obtain financial balance in 
2006 and expected the traffic to decrease under 35 billion tkm. 
Then in 2004, DA’s structure was modified by an arrêté, in readiness for the 
imminent arrival of new rail operators. For each path, DA became the product of the 
length of each network section used and a fee per path km. This new structure applied 
from 2006 on. Also, DRS of less expensive categories increased slightly. Zero terms 
were suppressed except for E off-peak hour category, but their level was still low (D= 
0.01 to 0.05 €/path-km and E= 0,005 €/path-km). On the contrary, the increase was 
important for C category: + 60 % in normal hours (0.13 €/path-km), and multiplied by 
15 in peak hours – still, the level remains quite low (1.25 €/path-km). A and B remain 
quite stable. In addition, DC freight increases by 3 %. 
Freight traffic remained more or less stable (increased by 1 % in tonnes but decreased 
1% in tkm). The Plan Fret seemed to achieve its 2004 target results, but traffic doesn’t 
fall under 40 billion tkm. The marshalling yards/ freight courtyards system was revised. 
Quality of service and productivity indicators showed a little improvement despite the 
increase of energy costs and important reorganisations in the industry. Some shippers 
report that SNCF’s freight tariffs doubled, or even were multiplied fourfold without 
prior consultation. All these evolutions of SNCF’s services and prices have in 2005 an 
overwhelming impact compared to the marginal impact of infrastructure charge 
evolution. 
In 2005, conventional track categories (A to E) are not much affected by 2005 DRS 
rises, except for C which DRS gets almost quadrupled (x 3,7) for off-peak hours and 
tripled for normal hours (0.38 €/path-km for both tariffs). DC freight increases slightly 
but remains about 1/3 of DC passenger. 
Freight traffic decreased by 12%, but it is understood that this was largely due to Plan 
Fret’s rationalisation. After a long controversy, the European Commission approved the 
800 M€ State aid for SNCF freight branch reorganization. 
The modifications of DA structure’s that were introduced in 2006 means that it is not 
possible to define its change in level from previous years. Although DA’s share in total 
charges is very small (around 4%), this modification was necessary in order to allow the 
development of new entrants’ traffic in a non-discriminative way –the package term 
would obviously have favoured SNCF. DA for conventional track categories was 0.015 
€/ path-km, except for D and E, which were zero. In addition, DRS increased by 4 % in 
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B off-peak hours (0.65 €/path-km). C off-peak and normal hour tariffs were aligned on 
this tariff (+70 %). Furthermore, DC freight increased by 15 %. 
Freight traffic remained stable. However, Plan Fret’s objectives, even after downward 
revision, were not achieved, and the freight branch ended the year with 260 M€ losses. 
Shippers pointed out a downfall in quality –especially punctuality on the second half of 
the year. CNC, the main rail-road container operator owned by SNCF, was restructured 
and focused its activity on maritime containers, abandoning most other market 
segments. 
In 2007 DRS’ main increase was concentrated on A off-peak hours (19 %) and C 
peak hours (20 %). In addition, DC Freight increased by 33 % (0.4 €/train-km). The 
freight branch launched a second reorganization plan in the August, focussing on single 
wagon traffic. This traffic is to be handled through 3 main “hubs” –Villeneuve-saint-
Georges (Paris), Sibelin (Lyons), Woippy (Metz)- and 31 regional yards, 262 courtyards 
(mainly located in Centre and Poitou-Charentes regions) being closed to single wagon 
traffic. Since this new organization was to be implemented within only 3-months 
following the announcement, shippers were forced to use emergency alternatives and 
local governments were alarmed. Strangely enough, the announcement was made while 
the Government organised the great debates of “Grenelle de l’Environnement”, that 
planned for non-road transport modes a +25% market share increase. Besides this, the 
strikes following the special working regimes reform in France, that highly concerned 
SNCF’s workers, brought on an estimated 80 M€ loss to freight branch. Recently, since 
high deficits continued and quality objectives were only partially met, SNCF issued 
another restructuring plan, including 1 billion Euros investment and a reorganization of 
its freight activities. 
Thus, there have been a number of modifications to infrastructure charges in France 
over the past decade, as well as some industrial upheaval arising out of reorganisation 
and new competition. Identifying clear and distinct impacts of these factors on the 
demand for rail freight would always be difficult, but the lack of data from the two main 
sources, SNCF and RFF, has been a major problem. Had it been possible to get the 
figures of quantities bought by rail operators for each type of tariff, we could have 
realistically sought to extract some kind of statistical link between tariffs and quantities 
bought. However, as it is, all that is possible is to draw some broad indications. 
In drawing any conclusions, we should recall that low-value freight traffic cannot bear 
high prices and is not very sensitive to transit time; therefore it is more likely to use low 
quality paths and thus less expensive track categories, especially D and E. Still, two of 
the three main marshalling yards -Villeneuve-Saint-Georges (Paris) and Sibelin (Lyons) 
- are located on category A sections, so that a notable part of freight traffic cannot avoid 
running on the most expensive track category. Except for a few postal TGVs, freight 
trains cannot run on high-speed (N) lines, even though this issue is under study for 
future high speed lines. Freight trains are also more likely to use off-peak paths during 
the night. 
As a whole, the increase of infrastructure charges for freight is important (see Table 
10) but less apparent than for passenger traffic. RFF’s global revenue for freight showed 
a 5 % increase from 1997 to 2004 with a 29% decrease in traffic (in tkm). The most 
important evolutions are those of track category C, coefficient K applied to reservation 
fee DRS, and circulation fee DC. The access fee DA decreased and remained stable at a 
low level since its new 2006 variable structure for all conventional (non-N) categories. 
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DRS increased mainly for track category C: A increased by 11% from 2002 to 2009, 
B increased by 28 % and C was multiplied by 15. D an E tracks began to pay a 
reservation fee in 2004. E tracks remained stable up to 2009 and D increased by 3%. 
DRS increased mainly in 2005, for C tracks only. 
Peak hour tariff remained around 1.9 times the normal hours tariff from 2002 to 2009. 
But off-peak hour’s coefficient increased from 0.27 to 0.42 during the same period, 
concerning more specifically freight trains. Indeed, the level of time differentiation has 
decreased during this period. 
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Figure 2: Freight Infrastructure Charges and Traffic Indicators from 1997 to 2006 (Base: 100). 
Figure 3: Freight Traffic (Mt-km) from 1997 to 2006. 
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freight. DC for freight doubled between 2002 and 2009. While freight infrastructure 
charges went up as described, freight traffic went on a downward trend from the end of 
the 1990’s (see Figure 2, Figure 3 and Table 10). These evolutions may seem, at first 
sight, to be closely related. 
Table 10: Charges per Freight Train-Km from 1997 to 2005. 
 
Total Freight 
Charges (M€) 
Freight Traffic 
(M train-km) 
Charges per train-
km (€) 
1997 155 155,6 1,00 
1998 159 154,1 1,03 
1999 163 154,8 1,05 
2000 165 154,7 1,07 
2001 167 144,3 1,16 
2002 170 143,9 1,18 
2003 156 130,4 1,20 
2004 163 121,6 1,34 
2005 159 105,7 1,50 
 
Nevertheless, the linkage between charges and traffic remains unclear and probably 
low; it would be certainly misleading to see tariff evolution as the main reason for 
freight traffic decreases; expert views and interviews of operators tend to think that the 
impact of tariffs is rather low. First, the main effect of tariff evolution, that occurred 
when reservation fees were effectively implemented, was the suppression of 
“facultative” paths that were unused, thus this effect does not appear in traffic figures. 
Second, even though it increased globally, the charge level still represents a low share in 
operators’ costs, especially for SNCF (around 8%), whereas the evolution of traffic 
showed important shocks that seem to be much more related to the changes in SNCF’s 
freight strategy. Indeed, reorganization plans, railway strikes, the liberalization of fret 
services and economic globalisation have extensively confused the price signal and 
impacted the traffic at a much higher degree than could do the relatively small signal of 
infrastructure charge. 
However, set now at higher levels, and in a more stable environment, infrastructure 
charges may play a stronger role in the future. At least, the steady increases, observed 
also in 2009 tariffs, may have an impact on operator’s purchase strategy –choice of day 
period, train speed, routes. Unfortunately, we couldn’t have any access to wagon 
loading rates, or to the relative use of off-peak periods, or to the distribution of train 
speed. 
RFF considers that freight operators have enough willingness to pay for long-haul, 
high-speed traffic, which is generally the most profitable. Nevertheless, French 
operators are doubtful about RFF’s ability to improve the quality of its freight path 
offer. Discussions have been led on 2010-2015 infrastructure charges tariffs; this 
resulted in new increases, so as to obtain a better cost coverage ratio for RFF in 
exchange for improved infrastructure quality for freight trains. The problem is that a 
good deal of freight traffic could simply not pay for the tariff increase and would then 
disappear. Therefore, a public contribution will, for several years, compensate the 
operators for the tariff increase. This contribution will, however, decrease progressively 
and then disappear, since it is expected that operators’ productivity gains, obtained both 
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by their own efforts and by the improvement of RFF’s freight paths, will make it 
possible to progressively increase the tariff effectively paid by the operators. 
As a conclusion, it has not been possible to show a precise impact of the increase and 
differentiation in RFF’s freight tariffs. The lack of data from the two main sources, 
SNCF and RFF, was a major problem. Very important events on the operators’ side and 
on the demand’s side had a major effect, and data available was not precise enough to 
get effects sorted out. Nevertheless, it is highly plausible that RFF tariffs’ evolution 
accompanied the other changes in the same direction, possibly accentuating the 
decreasing trends in traffic levels. 
 
4.3. Freight through Eurotunnel 
 
Eurotunnel provides an interesting case, as rail freight through the tunnel has 
performed somewhat disappointingly over a number of years and the charges faced by 
freight operators have consistently been cited as a potential cause of this poor 
performance. After 14 years of service, the channel tunnel is far from operating at the 
level of capacity requested by the reports giving support to the tunnel alternative for a 
cross-channel fixed link. Having originally had a design capacity of approximately 10 
million tonnes, freight traffic grew during the first 3 years of operation to three million 
tonnes in 1997. However, it then stagnated until 2000, before declining to just over one 
million tonnes in 2007. 
Table 11 and Table 12draw similar pictures for tunnel freight forecasts: a total traffic 
of about 30 million tonnes around 1993 and a total market share of about 35% for the 
tunnel, corresponding to about 10 Mt, with better market shares for rail wagons than for 
Le Shuttle. 
Table 11: Historical Forecast for Freight: Total Cross-Channel vs. Channel Tunnel (Million Tonnes). 
Freight forecasts 1969 1971 1980 1985 1990 2000 
MoT (1963) Via tunnel 2,6 2,9 4,0 4,5 - - 
Total demand - 5,7 13,1 - 25,3 - C & L (1973) 
Via tunnel - - 5,4 - 11,3 - 
Total demand - 5,7 12,9 - 20,2 - CTAG (1975) 
Via tunnel - - 5,3 - 7,8 - 
Total demand - - 15,9 - 27,3 37,2 DoT (1982) 
Via tunnel - - - - 8,6 11,1 
Source: Chevroulet et al, 2007; Anguera, 2006. 
Table 12: CTG-FM Unitised Freight Forecasts –Total Demand & Market Share (Million Tonnes). 
 
Cross-Channel 
1993 
Tunnel freight 
1993 
Market share 
1993 
Tunnel freight 
2003 
Roll-on/roll-off freight 24,2 6,0 25 7,5 
Containers and rail wagon 7,9 4,0 52 6,8 
Total 32,1 10,0 31 14,3 
Source: Chevroulet et al, 2007 ; Anguera, 2006. 
 
However, actual traffic was much different, as shown in Table 13 and Table 14. The 
total freight tonnage was underestimated by most of the forecasts, and the traffic of 
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through rail services remains very low compared to forecast and to freight shuttle. 
Freight shuttle service, in absolute terms, increased quite steadily ahead of what was 
forecast through to 2007. Nevertheless, forecasts for freight Shuttle’s market share 
appeared to be not far from what occurred. 
Table 13: Actual Channel Tunnel FreightTonnages (Million Tonnes). 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Le Shuttle Freight 0,8 5,1 6,7 3,3 9,2 10,9 14,7 15,6 15,6 16,7 
Through rail services - 1,3 2,4 2,9 3,1 2,9 2,9 2,4 1,5 1,7 
Total tunnel freight  0,8 6,4 9,1 6,2 12,3 13,8 17,7 18,8 17,1 18,4 
Source: Chevroulet et al., 2007; Anguera, 2006. 
Table 14: Actual Channel Tunnel Freight Tonnage (Million Tonnes). 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Le Shuttle Freight 16,6 17 16,9 18,4 
Through rail services 1,9 1,6 1,6 1,2 
Total tunnel freight  18,5 18,6 18,5 19,6 
Table 15: Cross-Channel Unitised Freight 1994-2003 (Million Tonnes). 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Channel tunnel 0,8 6,4 9,1 6,2 12,3 13,8 17,7 18,8 17,1 18,4 
Port of Dover 15,1 14,0 13,9 20,8 19,8 21,7 21,0 23,0 24,1 23,2 
Total cross-channel 15,9 20,4 23,0 27,1 32,1 35,5 38,7 41,1 41,2 41,6 
Source: Chevroulet et al., 2007; Anguera, 2006. 
 
Eurotunnel's only forecast that proved to be more or less correct is the freight Shuttle's 
market share. This traffic obeys mainly to road logics, for which existing methods, data 
and tools were more appropriate for doing forecasts. A hypothesis we can make is that 
by the time forecasts were made, the methods and tools used were built using these road 
logics, inducing no anticipation of strong competitive reaction (a shipping line is very 
mobile, unlike roads; prices are not often a competitive tool in the road sector) and 
modelling the competitive situation as a network composed of minor (high cost) “road 
links” for the ferries, compared to a new (low cost) motorway for the Tunnel. Another 
hypothesis is that Eurotunnel had more incentive and tools to reach its forecasts of roll-
on roll-off than of through trains. This last point leads us to the issue of infrastructure 
charges. 
The situation of infrastructure charges for using Eurotunnel is a complex one, having 
involved 3 major components. Prior to the opening of the tunnel, a fifty-year agreement 
was formed between Eurotunnel and the two then state railways, British Rail and SNCF, 
that each be allocated half of the tunnel’s capacity in return for the payment of 
infrastructure charges. In addition, the two railways agreed to pay a Minimum Usage 
Charge each year for using the tunnel, irrespective of how many trains actually used it. 
Thirdly, the two railways agreed to pay a fixed annual contribution to Eurotunnel’s 
operating costs, amounting to approximately £6.5 m each. 
The infrastructure charges were initially levied on a per tonne basis, based on a guide 
price of £10 per tonne and an overall volume of 10m tonnes. To that was added fixed 
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charges for Eurotunnel and for essential facilities at either end of the tunnel, each of 
which should have added another £1 per tonne. In reality though, those fixed charges 
were divided by the number of trains, and, since there were not many trains, this ended 
up resulting in very high charges. The per tonne charges were differentiated between 
bulk and non-bulk traffic, though – apparently somewhat counter-intuitively – the 
charge for non-bulk was three times that for bulk traffic. 
On rail privatisation in Britain, freight operations through the tunnel were sold to 
EWS, but it was agreed that government retain the responsibility for paying the 
infrastructure charges, the Minimum Usage Charge and the operating cost contribution 
through until November 2006. As of 2006, the agreement was that the Minimum Usage 
Charge would cease and the payment of infrastructure charges and the operating cost 
contribution would transfer to EWS. Subsequently, EWS have agreed with the 
government that the operating cost contribution continue to be paid by the government, 
leaving EWS to pay the remaining infrastructure charges. On the French side, SNCF 
has, throughout the past 14 years, been responsible for all 3 charging components. 
Following the cessation of the Minimum Usage charge and continued decline in rail 
freight traffic through the tunnel, discussion between the key stakeholders led to another 
set of revised charges being announced in autumn 2007. This set of charges, set out 
below, was issued as part of Eurotunnel’s strategy for ‘relaunching’ Open Access cross-
Channel rail freight. The charges are focused around a central average charge of 4.5k 
Euro (£3k) per train, irrespective of train-load. This central charge represents a 
significant reduction compared to the 2007 average charge of 8k Euro (£5,3k). 
Furthermore, the charges are differentiated according to speed and time of day. The 
central charge is based on a train passing through the tunnel at a speed of 120kph during 
a period of medium traffic density; lower charges are applicable for higher speeds 
and/or periods of lower traffic density, and vice-versa. Most intermodal/non-bulk traffic 
tends to travel at 120kph, whilst bulk traffic has tended to travel at slower speeds. At the 
same time, additional measures have been introduced to provide operators guarantees of 
equitable and efficient open access to the essential facilities at either end of the tunnel. 
These new charges, and the relaunch strategy, appear to be having clear impacts on 
rail freight traffic. Firstly, EWS report that they have increased the speed of their bulk 
traffic so as to take advantage of the lower charge for this. This has been somewhat 
fortuitous, as the change occurred at a time when they happened to have the rolling 
stock available to enable this. Secondly, EWS have announced the commencement of 
two regular Channel Tunnel services. Thirdly, though on a more negative note, Freight 
Europe UK have announced withdrawal of services apparently in response to the new 
charges. Freight Europe UK have been providing a less than train-load service between 
continental Europe and the UK which was, whilst charges were on a per-tonne basis, 
viable. However, with the switch to per-train charges, their payments have increased as 
they have begun having to pay for empty or part-empty trains. It may be that this is a 
temporary problem, as they rationalise their service and arrive at a new level of service, 
although it may also be the case that such a rationalised level of service may no longer 
be sufficiently attractive to customers and that they find their service having to be 
rationalised further. 
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Table 16: Eurotunnel Infrastructure Charges, 2007-08. 
Train @ 120 km/h Reservation fee per 
train single (£) 
Access fee per train 
single (£) 
Equivalent price per 
train single 
(based on 52 train 
single/year) (£) 
Off-peak period 270 2430 2700 
Intermediate period 300 2700 3000 
Peak period 330 2970 3300 
 
Train @ 100 km/h Reservation fee per 
train single (£) 
Access fee per train 
single (£) 
Equivalent price per 
train single (based 
on 52 train 
single/year) (£) 
Off-peak period 300 2700 3000 
 
Maintenance 
periods 
Reservation fee per 
train single (£) 
Access fee per 
train single (£) 
Equivalent price per 
train single (based 
on 52 train 
single/year) (£) 
All trains @ 100 km/h 300 2700 3000 
Source: Eurotunnel’s Network Statement - 2008 Working Timetable. 
 
The main problem of the forecasts, as compared with the actual traffic, seems to rely 
on the nature of the market Eurotunnel could try to grasp. The reaction of ferries proved 
to be quite effective at cutting Eurotunnel from a good part of its expected market, 
among other means by concentrating and reinforcing offers for origin-destination trips 
remote from the Channel. The decline in competitiveness relative to road transport, as a 
result of the impact of the fixed costs of frontier infrastructure (including security 
constraints) proved to be further constraints on channel Tunnel rail freight growth. 
Hence, the original charges were devised with no reference to the market, and the 
monopoly and state aid aspects of the market rendered them irrelevant as signals to the 
market. Since the removal of state aid, opening up of the market and establishment of 
the new charging regime, traffic appears, on the whole, to be responding positively, 
though it is too soon to say whether this is a sustained turn-around. 
 
4.4. Modelling Reactions in the British Rail Freight Market 
 
The effect of changes in rail access charge regimes on rail and road traffic in Britain 
have been modelled using the Leeds Freight Transport Model (LEFT) (Johnson et al, 
2007)). The LEFT model is essentially an aggregate mode split model for road and rail 
freight traffic in Britain, capable of forecasting changes in traffic for different 
commodities and modes following changes in transport costs. LEFT was initially 
constructed in 2002 and has been further developed over subsequent years, the current 
version being LEFT3. The model has no geography and uses Binary Logit models 
calibrated to existing data to perform mode split. Market size is determined using 
elasticities of tkm with respect to Generalised Cost and applying them with the mode 
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split element stripped out. Disaggregation within LEFT3 is by the following 
dimensions: 
 
1. The base data is split over 7 commodity groups consistent with the categories 
provided in the Department for Transport’s Continuing Survey of Road Goods 
Transport (CSRGT) data, reported in Transport Statistics Great Britain (TSGB) 
(DfT, annual): 
a. Food, Drink and Agricultural Products; 
b. Coal, Coke and related items; 
c. Petroleum and Petroleum Products; 
d. Metals and Ores; 
e. Aggregates and Construction; 
f. Chemicals and Fertilisers; 
g. Other, including manufactures, miscellaneous, containerised, and 
international. 
 
2. The base data by commodity is split over 9 distance bands, again consistent with 
those used by the CSRGT data. These are, 1-25 km, 25-50 km, 50-100 km, 100-
150 km, 150-200 km, 200-300 km, 300-400 km, 400-500 km and Over 500 km. 
We have taken the midpoint of the 500+ distance band to be 550 km. 
 
3. The base total market is split for each commodity and distance band according to 
whether traffic is favourable for rail operations, referred to as train-friendly (TF), 
or train-unfriendly (TU). For Bulks, TF traffic is that traffic we deem suitable for 
trainload movement from origin to destination. For Non-bulks (Food etc, and 
Miscellaneous), TF traffic is that to which we have assigned the need for 
collection and delivery (at most) at one end. 
 
There are therefore 2*7*9 = 126 cells in LEFT3. Traffic can switch mode or distance 
band, disappear altogether or new traffic can be generated. Just two modes were 
modelled - road and rail. The data used was collected from a variety of sources. For 
road, the primary source has been the Continuing Survey of Road Goods Transport, as 
reported in TSGB. For rail we have used unpublished data from the Strategic Rail 
Authority (SRA) with gaps being filled by our own best estimates. Base data relates to 
the period 1998-2000. All monetary amounts are in 2000 prices. A base for 2010 was 
obtained by projecting current trends forward. 
We were interested in looking at the responsiveness of rail traffic to different access 
regimes and pricing structures. Our aim was to see if, and to what extent, rail can 
replace some road traffic given the appropriate incentives. We determined the following 
six scenarios/policy tests to examine: 
 
- Removing current track access charges- the idea here is to create the best possible 
scenario for rail freight and see how much growth there could be in these 
conditions, with the aim of mode shift from road to rail on environmental 
grounds. 
- Halving current track access charges; again here the aim is to stimulate mode 
shift, whilst still recovering some track access revenues. 
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- Doubling current track access charges; here we see how rail traffic responds to a 
doubling of access charges across the board, with the aim of raising revenue from 
rail access charges. 
- Quadrupling current track access charges; as above but a larger increase. 
- Introduce a structure of fixed and variable track access charges; punishing short 
distance rail traffic. This is approximated using distance bands, with doubled 
access charges for the shortest distance band, tapering down to current charges at 
the longest distance. The justification for this scenario is to remove some short 
distance rail traffic, for which rail may be not as well suited and for which there 
are fewer environmental benefits of mode shift 
- A fixed and variable access charge stimulating long distance traffic. This is 
approximated by using differential charges over distance bands, with double 
access charges for the shortest distance, tapering down to ½ current charges at the 
longest distance. The justification here would be to stimulate a switch to rail from 
road only from that traffic for which rail is most suitable, namely long distance 
traffic, which will have a good environmental benefit and which is approximately 
revenue neutral. 
 
Table 17 and Table 18 report the results for the 6 different scenarios compared to the 
2010 Do Nothing. It can be seen that, in Scenario 1 (Zero Access Charges) Rail tonnes 
increase by 8.17 million (5.69%) and tkm increase by 2.13 billion (9.24%). Nearly half 
of the overall increased rail traffic is accounted for by an increase of 0.99 billion tkm in 
Ores & Metals. There is also a significant increase of 0.57 billion tkm in Others. The 
largest increases in rail’s share of tkm are found in Chemicals (by 31.75%), Ores & 
Metals (by 21.6%) and Others (12.08%). The smallest absolute increases are in rail’s 
Food, Drink & Agriculture and Petroleum tkm traffic. The smallest increases are in 
rail’s share of tkm of Food, Drink & Agriculture, Petroleum and Coal & Coke. 
In Scenario 2 (Halved Access Charges) Rail tonnes increase by 3.95 million (2.75%) 
and tkm by 1.02billion (4.43%). The magnitude of the effect of this scenario is 
approximately a half that of scenario 1, which is as expected. The increase of 0.48 
billion tkm in Ores & Metals accounts for nearly half of the overall increased rail traffic. 
There is also a significant increase in Others and Construction traffic. The largest 
increases in rail’s share of tkm are found in Chemicals (by 15.36%), Ores & Metals (by 
10.60%) and Others (5.85%). The smallest absolute increases are in rails’ Food, Drink 
& Agriculture , Petroleum, Coal & Coke and Chemicals tkm traffic. The smallest 
increases are in rail’s tkm share of Food, Drink & Agriculture, Petroleum and Coal & 
Coke. 
In Scenario 3 (Doubled Access Charges), Rail tonnes decrease by 7.16 million 
(4.99%) and tkm by 1.75billion (7.59%) overall. The drop of 0.83 billion tkm in Ores & 
Metals accounts for nearly half of the overall lost rail traffic. There is also a significant 
drop of 0.50 billion tkm in Others. The largest percentage reductions in rail shares of 
tkm are in Chemicals (by 27.54%), Ores & Metals (by 18.17%) and Others (by 
10.59%). The smallest absolute falls are in rails’ Food, Drink & Agriculture, Petroleum 
and Coal & Coke tkm. The smallest effects on rail’s share of tkm are in Food, Drink & 
Agriculture, Petroleum and Coal & Coke. 
In Scenario 4 (Quadrupled Access Charges), Rail tonnes decrease by 17.97 million 
(12.51%) and tkm by 4.29 (18.62%) overall. The drop of 1.88 billion tkm in Ores & 
Metals accounts for over one third of the overall lost rail traffic. There is also a 
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significant drop of 1.33 billion tkm in Others and 0.38 billion tkm in Construction. The 
largest reductions in rail’s share of tkm are in Chemicals (67.27%), Ores & Metals 
(41.12%) and Others (28.3%). The smallest absolute falls in rails’ Food, Drink & 
Agriculture and Petroleum tkm traffic. The smallest effects on rail’s share of tkm are in 
Food, Drink & Agriculture, Petroleum and Coal & Coke. 
In Scenario 5 (Higher Short Distance Access Charges) rail tonnes decrease by 4.28 
million (2.98%), and tkm by 0.82 billion (3.54%). Compared to scenario 3, tonnes fall 
by proportionally more than tkm highlighting that the reduction in rail traffic is more 
concentrated in the shorter distances than in scenario 3. In absolute terms, the drop of 
0.43 billion tkm in Ores & Metals accounts for more than half of the overall lost rail 
traffic. There is also a significant drop of 0.18 billion tkm in Others. The largest 
decreases in rail shares of tkm are in Chemicals (by 12.85%), Ores & Metals (by 
9.41%) and Others (by 3.88%). The smallest absolute decreases in Food, Drink & 
Agriculture, Petroleum, Coal & Coke and Chemicals tkm traffic. The smallest decreases 
in rail’s share of tkm are in Food, Drink & Agriculture, Coal & coke and Petroleum. 
In Scenario 6 (Higher Short Distance and Lower Long Distance Access Charges), rail 
tonnes decrease by 2.65 million (1.85%) and tkm decrease by 0.27 billion (1.16%), 
highlighting that much of the reduction in traffic is over the short distances. 
Interestingly there is little increase in Food, Drink & Agriculture tkm (0.06%) but 
decreases in all other commodities – very little of rail’s traffic in this commodity is in 
the shorter distances. The largest absolute falls are found in Ores & Metals and 
Construction. The largest decreases in rail share of tkm are in Chemicals (by 5.15%), 
Ores & Metals (by 4.02%) and Construction (by 1.04%). The smallest reductions in 
rail’s market share of tkm are found in Coal & Coke, Others and Petroleum. 
Overall, changes in rail freight traffic are driven primarily by the shifts in Ores & 
Metals traffic, (as this accounts for 19.8% of Rail’s overall tkm traffic), and also Others 
(accounting for 20.4%). Although Coal & Coke accounts for 22.3% of rail’s tkm traffic, 
there is little movement in tkm as its market share stays relatively static due to the level 
of captivity and the favourability of rail over longer distances. There are relatively 
significant changes in Construction, which accounts for 17.1% of rail’s tkm traffic. 
Whilst there are large shifts in the market shares of Chemicals, these represent very 
small absolute changes in tkm. 
In summary, by using LEFT, we were able to explore the potential impacts of 
variations in infrastructure charging in isolation from any other changes that might 
impact on the rail freight market. We found that by removing access charges, rail tonne 
kms increase by 9%, reducing road traffic by almost 2 billion tkm, just 1%. This 
highlights an underlying lack of competitiveness of rail in key freight markets such as 
Food Drink and Agriculture and Construction, because of high captivity to road 
transport, given the short distances involved and the lack of suitable rail infrastructure. 
We examined the sensitivity of the rail market to levels of access charges and found that 
rail is slightly less sensitive to access charge increases than it is to equivalent decreases. 
If we introduce different structures of access charging over distance bands, 
approximating a fixed and variable charging regime, we show how we can incentivise 
rail traffic over the longer distances where rail is more competitive and environmentally 
more beneficial. 
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Table 17: Tonnes Lifted by Commodity for Different Scenarios in 2010. 
Tonnes lifted [millions] Scenario Mode 
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Road 525.86 23.30 85.49 75.89 676.09 69.18 708.69 2164.50 Do nothing 
Rail 11.32 42.12 10.84 33.82 27.72 1.64 16.17 143.63 
Road 525.83 23.20 85.38 73.19 675.88 68.77 708.34 2160.60 
% change from 
do nothing -0.01 -0.42 -0.12 -3.57 -0.03 -0.60 -0.05 -0.18 
Rail 11.48 42.22 10.95 38.31 28.76 2.12 17.96 151.80 
Scenario 1 
Zero 
access 
charges 
% change from 
do nothing 1.41 0.24 0.99 13.29 3.74 29.57 11.06 5.69 
Road 525.84 23.25 85.44 74.56 675.98 68.99 708.52 2162.58 
% change from 
do nothing 0.00 -0.22 -0.06 -1.76 -0.02 -0.29 -0.02 -0.09 
Rail 11.39 42.17 10.89 36.04 28.17 1.87 17.05 147.58 
Scenario 2 
Halved 
Access 
Charges 
% change from 
do nothing 0.65 0.12 0.44 6.56 1.63 14.21 5.39 2.75 
Road 525.89 23.43 85.56 78.32 676.33 69.53 709.00 2168.05 
% change from 
do nothing 0.01 0.55 0.08 3.19 0.04 0.50 0.04 0.16 
Rail 11.18 41.99 10.77 29.70 27.02 1.23 14.57 136.46 
Scenario 3 
Doubled 
Access 
Charges 
% change from 
do nothing -1.19 -0.30 -0.61 -12.19 -2.52 -24.93 -9.94 -4.99 
Road 525.97 23.69 85.65 81.75 676.96 70.01 709.53 2173.57 
% change from 
do nothing 0.02 1.69 0.19 7.72 0.13 1.20 0.12 0.42 
Rail 10.89 41.73 10.70 23.88 25.99 0.66 11.82 125.66 
Scenario 4 
Quadruple
d Access 
Charges 
% change from 
do nothing -3.82 -0.93 -1.32 -29.39 -6.22 -59.94 -26.91 -12.51 
Road 525.88 23.37 85.54 77.46 676.24 69.37 708.84 2166.70 
% change from 
do nothing 0.00 0.32 0.06 2.07 0.02 0.27 0.02 0.10 
Rail 11.23 42.05 10.79 31.16 27.26 1.42 15.44 139.35 
Scenario 5 
Higher 
Short 
Distance 
Access 
Charges % change from 
do nothing -0.79 -0.18 -0.41 -7.85 -1.66 -13.46 -4.54 -2.98 
Road 525.88 23.35 85.52 76.98 676.20 69.29 708.75 2165.96 
% change from 
do nothing 0.00 0.20 0.04 1.43 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.07 
Rail 11.26 42.07 10.81 32.00 27.40 1.52 15.91 140.97 
Scenario 6 
Higher 
Short/ 
Lower 
Long 
Distance 
Charges 
% change from 
do nothing -0.51 -0.11 -0.30 -5.38 -1.14 -7.41 -1.61 -1.85 
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Table 18: Tonne-Kilometres by Commodity for Different Scenarios in 2010. 
Tonne kms [Billions] Scenario Mode 
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Road 63.33 2.31 8.29 8.53 35.91 8.84 73.09 200.30 Do nothing 
Rail 2.17 5.13 2.13 4.57 3.94 0.40 4.69 23.04 
Road 63.29 2.30 8.26 7.59 35.68 8.71 72.55 198.39 
% change from 
do nothing -0.06 -0.62 -0.27 -11.05 -0.62 -1.43 -0.74 -0.95 
Rail 2.21 5.24 2.17 5.56 4.19 0.53 5.26 25.17 
Scenario 1 
Zero 
access 
charges 
% change from 
do nothing 1.96 2.10 2.03 21.60 6.46 31.75 12.08 9.24 
Road 63.32 2.31 8.28 8.07 35.81 8.78 72.83 199.38 
% change from 
do nothing -0.03 -0.32 -0.12 -5.43 -0.26 -0.69 -0.36 -0.46 
Rail 2.19 5.18 2.15 5.06 4.05 0.46 4.97 24.06 
Scenario 2 
Halved 
Access 
Charges 
% change from 
do nothing 0.82 1.02 0.95 10.60 2.75 15.36 5.85 4.43 
Road 63.36 2.33 8.30 9.33 36.02 8.95 73.56 201.85 
% change from 
do nothing 0.04 0.61 0.18 9.42 0.32 1.24 0.65 0.78 
Rail 2.15 5.04 2.10 3.74 3.78 0.29 4.20 21.29 
Scenario 3 
Doubled 
Access 
Charges 
% change from 
do nothing -1.20 -1.85 -1.61 -18.17 -3.92 -27.54 -10.59 -7.59 
Road 63.40 2.36 8.32 10.34 36.19 9.11 74.35 204.07 
% change from 
do nothing 0.11 2.09 0.38 21.26 0.78 3.02 1.73 1.88 
Rail 2.10 4.87 2.04 2.69 3.55 0.13 3.36 18.75 
Scenario 4 
Quadrupled 
Access 
Charges 
% change from 
do nothing -3.41 -5.12 -4.13 -41.12 -9.76 -67.27 -28.30 -18.62 
Road 63.34 2.32 8.30 8.94 35.97 8.89 73.26 201.03 
% change from 
do nothing 0.02 0.40 0.11 4.84 0.19 0.58 0.23 0.36 
Rail 2.16 5.09 2.11 4.14 3.85 0.35 4.51 22.22 
Scenario 5 
Higher 
Short 
Distance 
Access 
Charges % change from 
do nothing -0.50 -0.72 -0.89 -9.41 -2.17 -12.85 -3.88 -3.54 
Road 63.33 2.32 8.29 8.70 35.94 8.86 73.09 200.54 
% change from 
do nothing 0.00 0.29 0.07 2.01 0.09 0.23 0.00 0.12 
Rail 2.17 5.12 2.12 4.39 3.90 0.38 4.69 22.77 
Scenario 6 
Higher 
Short/ 
Lower Long 
Distance 
Charges % change from 
do nothing 0.06 -0.12 -0.50 -4.02 -1.04 -5.15 -0.15 -1.16 
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5. Conclusions 
 
Infrastructure charges were introduced in Britain in 1995 and, when reviewed in 2001, 
were effectively halved for freight operators. Over the period, growth in freight traffic 
has been quite remarkable, in the order of 50% over 12 years. Within this, growth has 
been particularly notable in coal traffic, which rail is inherently better-suited to carrying, 
and in construction traffic which appears particularly price-sensitive. However, rail 
freight growth actually started in 1995, and we do not observe a major change in the 
trend around the time of the reductions in infrastructure charges introduced in 2001. 
Nevertheless, the structure of charges pper to be incentivising operators to reduce 
impact of rail freight on the network, e.g. by operating less-damaging rolling stock and 
by requiring fewer slots to operate a particular service. Further changes are soon to be 
implemented, involving greater differentiation and increased charging levels for freight-
only lines. It will be interesting to monitor any observable impacts of these forthcoming 
changes. 
Infrastructure charges in France were first implemented in 1997 and there have been 
several changes to charging structure and levels over the period. A differentiation 
between “rapid” (high value) freight traffic and other freight was introduced. The 
circulation charge for freight doubled between 2002 and 2009. While freight 
infrastructure charges went up as described, freight traffic went on a downward trend 
from the end of the 1990’s. These evolutions may seem, at first sight, to be closely 
related but the linkage between charges and traffic remains unclear and probably low. 
First, a notable effect occurred when reservation fees were implemented and led to the 
suppression of “facultative” paths that were unused. Second, even though it increased 
globally, the charge level still represents a low share in operators’ costs, especially for 
SNCF (around 8%), whereas the evolution of traffic showed important shocks that seem 
to be much more related to the changes in SNCF’s freight strategy. Indeed, 
reorganization plans, railway strikes, the liberalization of freight services and economic 
globalisation have extensively confused the price signal and impacted the traffic at a 
much higher degree than the relatively small signal of infrastructure charge could. 
However, set now at higher levels, and in a more stable environment, infrastructure 
charges may play a stronger role in the future. 
Eurotunnel provides an interesting case, as rail freight through the tunnel has 
performed somewhat disappointingly over a number of years and the charges faced by 
freight operators have consistently been cited as a potential cause of this poor 
performance. Having originally had a design capacity of c10 million tonnes, freight 
traffic grew during the first 3 years of operation to three million tonnes in 1997. 
However, it then stagnated until 2000, before declining to just over one million tonnes 
in 2007. The original charges were devised in the midst of rail re-structuring in both 
Britain and France, with no actual reference to the market. Furthermore, the monopoly 
and state aid aspects of the market rendered them irrelevant as signals to the market. 
Following the cessation of the Minimum Usage charge in 2006 and continued decline in 
rail freight traffic through the tunnel, discussion between the key stakeholders led to 
another set of revised charges being announced in autumn 2007. 
Since the removal of state aid, opening up of the market and establishment of the new 
charging regime, traffic appears, on the whole, to be responding positively, though it is 
too soon to say whether this is a sustained turn-around. 
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The effect of changes in rail access charge regimes on rail and road traffic in Britain 
have been modelled using the LEeds Freight Transport Model (LEFT) (Johnson, 
Whiteing and Fowkes (2007)). Six scenarios/policy tests examined the effects of: 
 
- Removing current track access charges; 
- Halving current track access charges; 
- Doubling current track access charges; 
- Quadrupling current track access charges; 
- Introduce a structure of fixed and variable track access charges; punishing short 
distance rail traffic; 
- A fixed and variable access charge stimulating long distance traffic. 
 
By using LEFT, we have been able to explore the potential impacts of variations in 
infrastructure charging in isolation from any other changes that might impact on the rail 
freight market. We have found that by removing access charges, rail tonne-kilometres 
increase by 9%, reducing road traffic by almost 2 billion tkm, just 1%. This highlights 
an underlying lack of competitiveness of rail in key freight markets such as Food Drink 
and Agriculture and Construction, because of high captivity to road transport, given the 
short distances involved and the lack of suitable rail infrastructure. We have examined 
the sensitivity of the rail market to levels of access charges and found that rail is slightly 
less sensitive to access charge increases than it is to equivalent decreases. If we 
introduce different structures of access charging over distance bands, approximating a 
fixed and variable charging regime, we have shown how we can incentivise rail traffic 
over the longer distances where rail is more competitive and environmentally more 
beneficial. 
Data availability issues have placed constraints on the level of analytical detail that 
we have been able to achieve. For further systematic analysis in this area, one might, 
ordinarily, seek to employ some form of econometric or statistical modelling exercise. 
However, for this, one would require detailed cost and demand statistics at the train 
operator level, and this would appear not to be available to us. Nevertheless, the case 
study research has helped to identify key trends and issues, whilst we have also been 
able to pursue some interesting modelling ideas. It is clear that modelling can help in 
identifying the cases where the final impact of infrastructure charges is rather low, and 
therefore in giving indications about the degree of desirability of infrastructure charge 
differentiation, given some minimal data requirements on the market segments 
concerned. 
Besides data requirements, the research field of imperfect competition in rail markets 
seems to be quite important if we want to explore these important issues further and 
have a better understanding of what the final indirect impacts of infrastructure charging 
are, once interactions between competitors and demand converge to an equilibrium. 
Simulation models, such as those developed by Meunier and Quinet (see “Effect of 
imperfect competition on infrastructure charges” in this issue) appear to provide a 
promising line of further research in this area. 
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